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Abstract 
In the context of genocide, international criminal law articulates the “truth” about a situation, asserting for example that 
victimization in genocide occurs mainly through rape. Consequently, international criminal dictates which harms are 
“extraordinary” such as rape, for example, and who can speak about them. It follows that when international criminal 
law is dealing with genocide’s victims, there appear to be two interconnected, troubling effects. Firstly, we have the 
exclusion of harm suffered by some victims with the focus specifically on certain victims and thus in the process, we 
witness the construction of an ideal victim subject, and secondly, the manufacture of a hierarchy of victims takes shape. 
This contribution contends that by focusing exclusively on rape as a genocide crime other forms of victimization which 
occur during genocide are not taken in full consideration. Consequently, and for such reason, it is difficult to argue that 
international criminal law as we know it can fully provide justice to all victims of genocide. 
 
Key words: rape, ideal victim, international criminal law, civil society. 
 
Riassunto 
Nel contesto del genocidio, la legge penale internazionale definisce la “verità” su una situazione, affermando ad esempio che 
la vittimizzazione nel genocidio avviene principalmente attraverso lo stupro. Ne consegue che quando il diritto penale in- 
ternazionale si occupa delle vittime del genocidio, sembrano esserci due effetti interconnessi e preoccupanti. In primo luogo, 
l’esclusione del danno sofferto da alcune vittime con l’attenzione specifica su certe altre e, quindi, nel processo si assiste alla 
costruzione di un soggetto vittima ideale e, in secondo luogo, prende forma la determinazione di una gerarchia di vittime. 
Questo contributo sostiene che concentrandosi esclusivamente sullo stupro come crimine specifico del genocidio si trascu- 
rano altre forme di vittimizzazione che, pur verificandosi durante il genocidio, non sono prese in piena considerazione. Di 
conseguenza, e per tale ragione, è difficile sostenere che il diritto penale internazionale, così come lo conosciamo, possa ga- 
rantire pienamente giustizia a tutte le vittime del genocidio. 
 
Parole chiave: violenza sessuale, vittima ideale, diritto internazionale penale, società civile. 
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Introduction 
Consistently, international criminal law is enlisted to sup- 
port arguments for the existence of unbiased mechanisms 
when seeking justice for genocide’s victims (Brienen and 
Hoegen, 2000). Regarded as a system able of removing the 
local peculiarities of national criminal justice systems whilst 
putting in their place a unified system of transnational 
justice, international criminal law has nonetheless the 
power to define and legitimate some victims’ narratives, 
while at the same time, silence and suppress other victims’ 
meanings (Koskenniemi, 2002) or stories (Fein, 1979). 
More specifically, in the context of genocide, 
international criminal law articulates the “truth” about a 
situation, asserting for example that victimization in 
genocide occurs mainly through rape (de Alwis, 2010). 
International criminal law creates meaning and it is an 
authoritative, yet at times re- mains a selective and 
biased source of the “crime of all crimes” (Kuper, 1985). 
Consequently, international criminal law produces, 
legitimates and mediates harm suffered by victims 
according to its internal and external mechanisms of 
legal governmentality (Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005). It 
authoritatively dictates which harms are “extraordinary” 
such as rape, for example, and who can speak about them 
(Buss, 2009). It follows that when international criminal 
law is dealing with genocide’s victims, there appear to be 
two interconnected, troubling effects. Firstly, we have the 
exclusion of harm suffered by some victims with the 
focus specifically on certain victims (Hall, 2012) and thus 
in the process, we witness the construction of an ideal 
victim subject, and secondly, the manufacture of a 
hierarchy of victims takes shape. Such outcomes give rise 
and support practices of (in)justice for genocide’s victims 
as the ideal victim (Christie, 1986), the victim par 
excellence is the person who has been raped (de Brouwer, 
2009) whilst other gender-based harms are often ignored 
or set aside (de Guzman, 2012). This contribution 
contends that by focusing exclusively on rape as a 
genocide crime other forms of victimization which occur 
during genocide are not taken in full consideration. 
Consequently, and for such reason, it is difficult to argue 
that international criminal law as we know it (Dixon et 
al., 2002) can fully provide justice to all victims of 
genocide. Being a victim is an extremely malleable 
concept, especially because there are different disciplines 
of reference in aid of a definition, which supports and 
expands the legal one, reflecting many of the nuances 
found in the definition of genocide (Policek, 2012).At the 
outset, three distinct sets of problems arise in the design, 
implementation and effects of criminal sanctions for vic- 
tims of genocide, when this demarcation remains within a 
legalistic framework (De Waal, 2010). First, with regard to 
the experience of the victims, international criminal law, it 
is argued here, is not able to develop languages and 
mechanisms affording a satisfactory response to the 
horrors of genocide, when it is pivotal to include all 
victims (Douglas, 2001; Drumbl, 2007). Furthermore, 
international criminal law is incapable of simultaneously 
teach history, as well as the evidence of all the victims, and 
at the same time do jus- tice, whilst providing adequate 
recognition and compensation to all victims (Booth and 
du Plessis, 2005). The third point concerns the legitimacy 
of the experiences of all victims and how the stories 
produced by international criminal tribunals are largely 
intended to give authority to the institutions or states 
which are the object of accusations (Askin, 2003). Here the 
reference is specifically to the narratives of genocide’s 
victims of rape in the former Yugoslavia (Calvetti and 
Scovazzi, 2004) and Rwanda (Dixon, 1997; Reyntjens, 
2004). 
Finally, this contribution claims that the answers of the 
international criminal law are totally inadequate unless the 
definition of victim of genocide is deconstructed to high- 
light the restrictions afforded by a purely legalistic response. 
Ultimately, the proposal here is for a criminology of geno- 
cide (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2009) which must 
critically evaluate the limitations of legal responses to geno- 
cide and examine the politics and principles behind defini- 
tions of genocide’s victims (Day and Vandiver, 2000). 
 
 
1. Defying genocide’s victims in international law 
In law, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice forVic- 
tims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General 
Assembly on 29th November 1985, sets out to offer a con- 
cise definition of what it means to be a victim and subse- 
quently recommends four avenues of redress for victims: 
access to justice and fair treatment, restitution, compensa- 
tion, and assistance (Dixon et al., 2002).The Victims 
Declaration identifies victims of crime all individuals 
who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, 
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in 
violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, 
comprising also those laws proscribing criminal abuse of 
power (Horowitz, 1997). The term victim similarly 
includes, where applicable, the immediate family or 
dependents of the direct victim and persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or 
to prevent victimization (Marcus, 1992). Fundamental to 
this definition, is the four avenues of redress which are 
subscribed by the Victims Declaration (Gaynor and 
Harmon, 2004). Access to justice and fair treatment 
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means that victims should be treated with compassion and 
respect for their dignity and furthermore, that they be en- 
titled to gain access to the mechanisms of justice and to 
prompt redress for the harm that they have undergone. 
Restitution is defined as the return of property or payment 
for the harm or loss suffered and it rests on the 
acknowledgment that those responsible for victimization 
should make fair restitution to their victims, including the 
victims’ families and dependents. The concept of 
compensation essentially takes off where restitution fails 
and looks toward the potential, although often sporadic, 
altruism of States. The rationale would be that when 
compensation is not fully available from the offender or 
other sources, States are tasked to provide financial 
compensation to victims, their families and dependents, 
and even, if and when appropriate, to look at the 
possibility of setting up trust funds. 
The theory of assistance embeds the notion that victims 
should receive the crucial material, medical, psychological 
and social assistance that can be offered through 
governmental, voluntary and community-based 
indigenous channels. Such assistance should be made 
readily available to all victims, with attention paid to 
individual needs. The Victims Declaration is by no 
means binding, nonetheless its ambition of promoting the 
victims’ needs under international law has begun to be 
effective. Many steps, however limited, have been taken 
towards advancing victims’ rights under international 
criminal law, all of which might never have occurred had 
the ground not first been broken by the Victims 
Declaration (Hall, 2012). Building from the Decla- 
ration, on 16th December 2005, the United Nations Gene- 
ral Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
SeriousViolations of International Humanitarian Law, also 
known as the Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles. There are 
two major divergences between the Victims Declaration 
and the van Boven Principles. First, the van Boven Princi- 
ples accentuated state, as opposed to individual, responsi- 
bility.This shift accounts for the realistic understanding that 
restitution as a general rule is easier to secure from states, 
as opposed to the limited resources of individuals. Second, 
the van Boven Principles introduced the term reparations 
into the vernacular of international criminal jurisprudence. 
Reparations, which as a term did not appear in theVictims 
Declaration, is used as a general term to describe all forms 
of redress, including but not limited to, restitution, com- 
pensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition. The van Boven Principles then proceeded 
to examine each form of reparations. Significantly, van 
Boven clarified that restitution should be applied to rein- 
state the situation that existed prior to the violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law (Neier, 1998).  Explic- 
itly, restitution requires restoration of liberty, family life, 
and citizenship, among other examples. Curiously, van 
Boven encapsulates the meaning of restitution in the same 
tradition as previously defined in the Victims Declaration. 
Following such tradition, it is stated that compensation 
should be offered for any economic damage resulting from 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Van 
Boven also argued that rehabilitation should be provided 
to victims and should include medical and psychological 
care as well as legal and social services. Lastly, to provide 
assurances of non-repetition, victims should be afforded 
with the cessation of continuing violations. In order to pre- 
vent the recurrence of victimization, a full and public dis- 
closure of the truth together with an official declaration 
restoring the dignity, reputation and legal rights of the vic- 
tim are very much needed. Importantly, when devising 
strategies of justice, it must be borne in mind that lack of 
reparation for victims and impunity of perpetrators should 
both be considered. Therefore, all efforts and strategies 
aimed at strengthening the normative framework in the 
pursuit for justice have to expose the clear nexus that oc- 
curs between impunity of perpetrators and the failure to 
provide just and adequate reparation for the victims. The 
reference to victims, however, remains embedded within 
discourses framed around the construction of the authentic 
victim. Conversely, while it is accurate to claim that a vast 
array of gender-based harms have either been habitually 
ignored in post-genocide justice mechanisms or not speci- 
fically framed as gendered harms, it is possible workable 
to contend that the very attention given to sex crimes 
against women within international jurisdictions has at 
least opened up possibilities for pursuing other forms of 
gendered violence (Buss, 2007). It should not be 
overlooked, for example, that at the first trial since the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials at the ICTY, the accused 
Tadic was convicted for aiding and abetting the sexual 
assault of male detainees, which included the sexual 
mutilation of prisoners (Mis- chkowski and Mlinarevic, 
2009). 
 
2. The authentic genocide’s victim 
Although rape has been recognised as a crime of genocide 
in contemporary international criminal jurisdictions (de 
Alwis, 2010), this acknowledgment, albeit favourably wel- 
comed, has resulted in other gender-based harms ignored 
or shelved (Marcus, 1992).The concern relates to the im- 
pact that genocide rape prosecutions can have on suppress- 
ing or excluding other harms against women and the way 
in which the ideal or “authentic” victim subject (Mibenge, 
2010) has come to dominate the field. This is to say that 
rape in genocide situations is at the exclusion of other 
forms of violence against women and, also, more worry- 
ingly, rape has questionably become synonymous with vi- 
olence against women, omitting the experience of men 
(Jones, 1994).The focus on sexual violence seems to have 
blocked any consideration of other gender based violence 
that occurs in genocide, such as the lack of reproductive 
health assistance and broader socio-economic harms. 
Equally worrying is that the fact that the focus on sexual 
violence against women has the effect of diverting attention 
away from male victims of gender-based harms (Jones, 
1994). The tendency to conflate gender with female has 
meant that sexual violence against males is often not con- 
textualised specifically as a gender-based crime (Carthy, 
Bates and Policek, 2019).When thinking about raped geno- 
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cide victims, the reference is inevitably to a woman (Mar- 
cus, 1992): the focus on women has ignored rape and other 
forms of sexual humiliation and abuse against males, forcible 
conscription, massacre and torture. Carpenter (2006) high- 
lights how there is a widespread assumption that women 
constitute the majority of wartime rape victims, which has 
the effect of obscuring the extent to which adult men and 
adolescent boys also face gender-based violence, including, 
but not exclusively encompassing, sexual violence. It is 
worth mentioning here that the discourse on forced im- 
pregnation of women during conflict has the effect of 
placing children born of rape on the periphery, not as 
rights-bearers or victims of genocide. Related to these per- 
ceived exclusions, along similar lines, Buss (2009) has con- 
tended that the rapes of Hutu women or men from both 
Tutsi and Hutu groups have not captured the attention of 
the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) 
because the authentic victim subject is predominantly the 
female Tutsi genocide victim. This, she maintains, reveals 
that some rapes are paradigmatic or overtly visible in inter- 
national criminal law, which can have the effect of render- 
ing other rapes invisible, or less important. She also notes 
that the fixation of rape as an instrument of genocide sup- 
presses or obscures a wider narrative about wartime sexual 
violence, such as why the rapes happened in the first place, 
how women expressed resistance and negotiation and the 
ways in which sexual violence is connected to structural 
and systemic conditions existing prior to the outbreak of 
violence (Buss, 2009). Already, the construction of a rape 
hierarchy within national criminal justice systems has been 
fervently critiqued (Askin, 2003).The argument here is that 
stranger rape attracts significantly more public sympathy 
and attention than acquaintance rape and is prosecuted far 
more vigorously than other violent crimes (Estrich, 1987), 
with MacKinnon (2006) bluntly but powerfully stating that 
under law, rape is not regarded as a crime when it looks like 
sex. This judicial blindness is evident at the international 
level also, for example, in the failure of the Tokyo war 
crimes trial to prosecute the sexual enslavement of ‘comfort 
women’ (Henry, 2013); the heated debates surrounding the 
legitimacy of German women’s victimisation during the 
1945 Soviet invasion of Berlin (Halley, 2008a); the hostile 
and suggestive cross-examination of Muslim women and 
girls who were detained in schools, apartments and sport 
centres during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Jones, 
1994); and the silence of post-conflict justice mechanisms 
regarding forced marriage and other forms of coercive sex- 
ual encounters in conflict zones (Nikoli-Ristanovi, 1999). 
This historical trajectory reflects law’s fixation on consent 
(as opposed to sexual autonomy) as the determining factor 
in securing not only a guilty verdict but genuine public 
sympathy. Like domestic rape trials, the ‘authentic’ victim 
subject is not one who has been somehow made – by dis- 
course – complicit in her subjugation. There are 
unintended consequences resulting from the international 
criminalisation of rape during genocide, in particular, 
that the prosecution of sexual violence at the 
international level can contribute to a one-dimensional 
narrative of suffering and perpetration, positioning some 
victims as the authentic victim subject, silencing other less 
conventional narratives and obscuring the role that 
colonialism and sexism play in the perpetration of these crimes. 
 
3. Genocide’s victims of rape 
There has been much debate about the need to treat inter- 
national crimes as separate, both procedurally and substan- 
tively, from ordinary domestic crimes (Quijano, 2012). 
International courts and international criminal law priori- 
tise so called exceptional or extraordinary crimes in the 
elements of the crimes and the prosecution strategies 
(Drumbl, 2007). Under international law, these extraordi- 
nary crimes are shaped by the fundamental principle of jus 
cogens (i.e. compelling law) (Charlesworth, and Chinkin, 
1993). This refers to a set of indeterminate peremptory 
norms accepted and recognised by the international com- 
munity, such as the prohibition of genocide. These norms 
are non-derogable by international or local laws or customs 
and as such their violation should be prioritised due to their 
gravity. The peremptory norm aspect of the crime is its 
ab- solute prohibition based on its severity. When 
committed during genocide, breaches of obligations under 
these norms constitute grave breaches of international 
humanitarian law and as such give rise to universal 
jurisdiction under the Geneva Conventions and arguably 
underscore the rationale for international prosecution 
(Grewal, 2012). Because rape has been interpreted by 
international and regional courts to constitute genocide, 
this therefore would suggest uncontestably that acts of 
sexual violence fit within the prism of peremptory norms. 
However, the prohibition of sexual violence can only 
reach the glory of jus cogens if associated with other 
crimes. In other words, it does not reach jus co- gens 
status on its own volition, which it could be argued is a 
gendered legacy of patriarchal legal culture (Mardorossian, 
2002).This issue remains unresolved and scholars and legal 
experts continue to debate whether rape should be a stand- 
alone crime subject to universal jurisdiction under 
customary international law (Mitchell, 2005).While 
systematic or genocidal forms of sexual violence at the 
highest level have been prosecuted, random, isolated or 
individual rapes as well as other forms on interpersonal 
violence are generally not dealt with by international 
courts (de Brouwer, 2009).The effect of exceptionalising 
some rapes and not others is concerning because it 
reinforces the notion of the authentic and ideal victim. In 
addition to trepidations about exceptionalising rape in 
genocide, some feminist scholars (de Guzman, 2012), 
have questioned the “over-criminalisation” of genocide 
rape on the basis that rape might not in fact be the worst 
thing that can happen to a woman during genocide. For 
instance, rape was not the worst of horrible experiences 
for German women at the end of the Second World War 
(Halley, 2008a). It could also be argued that prioritising the 
prosecution of rape may not have entirely good effects 
because the “badness” of rape can be used in alarming ways 
to advance certain political and nationalistic ideologies 
(Halley et al. 2006). Also, within this “reading” of rape, 
women’s consent to sex during conflict is negated due to 
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stringent rules on consent in some jurisdictions, with the 
problematic effect of eliding rape, sex work, forced marriage 
and “garden variety cohabitation” (Halley et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, rape may not be the worst thing that can 
happen to a woman during genocide (Hagan and Kaise, 
2011). Unsurprisingly, international criminal law 
constructs a hierarchy of crimes due to the grave breaches’ 
regime, the linking of various crimes with the categories 
of crimes against humanity and genocide and the 
associated decision to prose- cute some crimes over 
others. However, while this is to some extent 
unavoidable, the debate about whether or not rape is the 
worst crime that can happen to a woman or to a man; 
whether rape is worse for a man than it is for a woman 
and vice versa, or whether sexual violence inflicts greater 
harm than killing, or is a more serious crime (de 
Guzman, 2012; Sharratt, 2011), remains problematic. First 
of all, the questioning of the uniform gravity of sexual 
violence, in order to avoid universalism and embrace 
diversity, supports the question, conceived of as “worse”’ 
by whom, how and when, which in turn reinforces the 
creation of the authentic and ideal victim in genocide. It 
follows that a fixation on whether or not rape is the worst 
of crimes in genocide is a distraction to the more 
important questions surrounding the efficacy of 
international criminal law for providing recognition and 
justice for victims, meaning all victims of genocide. 
Finally, this fixation reifies and consolidates problematic 
rape hierarchies (that are all too familiar in domestic 
settings) and as such may serve to reinforce rape myths and 
marginalise victims further by calling them to account for 
their injury and victimisation (Schabas, 2003). 
 
 
4. Justice for victims 
During the conferences that led to the creation of the 
International Crime Court (Schabas, 2000), much debate 
arose over the appropriate restitution that should be granted 
to victims mainly because similar provisions of the Statutes 
and Rules of the ICTY and the ICTR (International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) were deemed ineffective. 
The Statutes of the ICTs (International Criminal Tribunals) 
provide that the Trial Chambers could order the return of 
any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, 
including by means of duress, to their rightful owners 
(Dixon et al., 2002). Likewise, the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICTs provide for the restitution of property 
and state that the judgment finding the accused guilty of a 
crime which has caused injury to a victim must be trans- 
mitted to the competent authorities of the states concerned 
so that the victims can bring an action in a national court 
or other competent body to endeavor to obtain economic 
compensation (Dixon et al., 2002). Regrettably, neither 
International Criminal Tribunal has addressed or ordered 
either form of reparation. “In any event, these rules fall 
well short of providing reparations or establishing a 
compensation scheme”, - in the event of rape, 
compensation is even more difficult to quantify. 
Furthermore, the rules provide an opening for future 
movement, but nothing more. Luckily, this slight opening 
 was sufficient to help create tremendous debate over such 
schemes during the ICC debates. The ICTR Registry has 
thus begun to explore the idea of establishing a trust fund 
“to provide financial support to programs, primarily 
operated by non-governmental organizations and other 
institutions, which would assist victims.” This concept was 
further explored during the creation of the ICC. The 
permanent ICC was created as a deterrent to impunity, as 
a means towards eliminating the world’s most horrendous 
crimes and as instrumentality to redress the victims of 
genocide. The ICC is expected to function as an 
independent, impartial, just and effective, permanent judi- 
cial institution and to stand as a monument to the struggles 
of the past. Admittedly, these are ambitious aims. 
Particularly since the wars in Rwanda (Dixon, 1997) and 
the Former Yugoslavia (Calvetti and Scovazzi, 2007) and 
the more recent events in Sierra Leone (Kenn, 2005) and 
Kosovo (Mischkowski and Mlinarevic, 2009) underscore 
that genocide has become a growth industry (De Waal, 
2010).Yet in what surely is a testament to the fortitude of 
human nature, the world’s nations have banded together 
to embrace these goals. 
Unlike the Statutes and Rules of the ICTs, the Rome 
Statute for an International Criminal Court consistently 
underscores the fact that one of the ICC’s primary purposes 
is to protect and vindicate the victims of genocide. For 
example, discussing the functions and powers of the 
Trial Chamber, the Rome Statute states that trials must be 
“conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused 
and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 
Furthermore,“[w]here the Trial Chamber is of the opinion 
that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case 
is re- quired in the interests of justice, particularly in the 
interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may ... request 
the Prosecutor present additional evidence ... [and may 
order] that the trial be continued” even after an admission 
of guilt by the accused. These procedures might offer the 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition required by 
the van Boven Principles by providing a “public 
acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of 
responsibility.” ‘References to victims’ interests can also 
be seen in less obvious contexts. Article 36 of the Rome 
Statute, which deals with the qualifications, nomination 
and election of judges, stresses that states “shall also take 
into account the need to include judges with legal 
expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to, 
violence against women and children. ”This reference to 
women and children emphasizes the growing 
understanding of the various types of sensitivities that must 
be addressed when examining victimization (Grewal, 2012). 
Nonetheless, there is an implicit albeit not explicit 
acknowledgment that rape can be experienced by men 
and that rape might not be the only crime of violence 
com- mitted during genocide. With regard to 
compensation, the Rome Statute handled the issue by 
incorporating theories from the Victims Declaration and 
the van Boven Principles. Building from the emerging 
idea of utilizing trust funds to assist victims, the Rome 
Statute also provides for a trust fund to be established 
“for the benefit of victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and the families of 
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such victims.” Furthermore, under the Rome Statute, the 
ICC has the discretion to order money and other property 
collected by the ICC through fines or forfeiture to be 
transferred to that trust fund. The Rome Statute does not 
detail how the trust fund should be managed, but instead 
leaves that determination to the states that are parties to the 
Rome Statute. This shift of burden allows more research 
to be undertaken to determine the best manner to 
incorporate the needs of victims and the cooperation of 
states into such compensatory schemes. Clearly such 
endeavor could be successful only when there is a legal 
and intellectual departure from the notion of the authentic 
victim. 
Besides a trust fund, the Rome Statute also authorizes 
the ICC to award reparations to, or in respect of, the victims 
of genocide. The ICC defines the term reparations in 
light of the Victims Declaration and the van Boven 
Principles, using the language of restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation. The ICC however is not 
empowered to order states to award reparations to 
victims. The ICC may, how- ever, make the order 
“directly against a convicted person” and states that are 
parties to the Rome Statute are required to cooperate in 
collecting such awards. Furthermore, when appropriate, 
the ICC can order that the reparations are made through 
the trust funds. It is regrettable that the ICC will not be 
empowered with the ability to order that the states 
themselves make reparations to victims, since states could 
be in a much better position than individuals to make such 
offers. It became evident during the U.N. Preparatory 
Committee Meetings, however, that this ICC was meant 
solely to prosecute individuals and, thus, any power to en- 
force awards of reparations against states would threaten not 
only the sovereignty of the concerned states, but also their 
support for the creation of the ICC. The fact, however, 
that reparations were accepted into the Rome Statute of 
the ICC at all and that language relating to victims was 
laced throughout the statute, was still a major 
advancement for the consideration of the plight of 
victims in the international arena. Such legal framework 
paves the way for the introduction of a model that takes 
into consideration collective victimization in genocide. 
The ultimate aim being the dismantlement of the 
hierarchy of victims. The claim here is for civil society as 
a whole to be considered as a victim of genocide (Policek, 
2012). 
 
 
5. Dismantling the hierarchical model: collective 
victimization in genocide 
In addition to various forms of direct violence in genocide, 
with rape being the most recognised crime, collective  
victimization too can entail structural violence, meaning 
the unequal distribution of power and resources between 
groups thus preventing people from being able to meet 
basic needs (Mamdani, 2009).Thus, collective victimization 
resulting from either structural or direct violence can have 
severely detrimental effects on material and physical well- 
being as well as on psychological well-being and mental 
health of groups and populations affected by genocide (Pas- 
coe and Smart Richman, 2009). Moreover, the detrimen- 
tal effects on mental health, such as posttraumatic stress 
disorder, can even be transmitted through generations 
(Wohl and Van Bavel, 2011), hence the claim that collec- 
tive victimization in genocide should be fully 
acknowledged. It is important to distinguish between 
objective instances of collective victimization, for example 
assessing exposure to violence, and how individuals 
subjectively perceive them. The subjective sense of 
collective victimization is referred to as collective 
victimhood, which may even be held by group members 
who are separated by generations from the historical 
victimization events (Vollhardt, 2012). Subjective 
perceptions of collective victim- hood vary individually 
and shape the impact of collective victimization on 
psychological well-being. In recent years, there has 
been increased interest in the consequences of 
collective victimhood in genocide (Vollhardt, 2012). 
Most of this research has also focused on detrimental 
effects. More research has focused on collective 
victimhood in the context of genocide or in the aftermath   
of genocide, with the intent to dismantle the hierarchy of 
victimization in genocide. To this extent, victimized 
groups who thought that their group has suffered more 
than other groups in genocide (competitive victimhood) 
were also less likely to express willingness to forgive the 
other side. Genocide victims who endorsed a greater 
sense of collective victimhood were also less open to new 
information about their victimization during and after 
genocide and less willing to compromise (Halperin et al., 
2008). Moreover, correlational studies (Schori-Eyal et al., 
2014) and experimental studies (Wohl and Branscombe, 
2008) show that awareness of historical genocide 
victimization can increase conflict-exacerbating attitudes 
(such as feeling less collective guilt for harmdoing 
against different groups or supporting military actions) 
in the presence, in a seemingly unrelated context.There 
can even be effects on the wider society relations more 
generally. Be- cause of the potential severity of these 
problems, it is per- haps not surprising that this has been 
the focus of research and policy concerns related to 
collective victimhood (Oosterveld, 2012). 
The most common mode of thinking about collective 
victimhood involve victims’ focus on how their group has 
suffered indistinct and unique ways, which can be referred 
to as exclusive victim consciousness. Within this category, 
there are several different kinds of victim beliefs further 
reinforced by the legitimization offered by the legal 
frame- work that, as already stated, supports a hierarchy of 
victims. While exclusive victim beliefs can refer to a specific 
conflict and comparisons with the other conflict 
party/ies - i.e., conflict-specific exclusive victim 
consciousness such as in the instance of women raped 
during genocide -, other exclusive victim beliefs 
compare their group’s victimization more generally to 
other victim groups - i.e., general exclusive victim 
consciousness (Bilali et al., 2016). A common form of 
genocide-specific exclusive victim consciousness is 
competitive victimhood: when group members claim to 
have suffered more than the other party (Noor et al., 2008). 
Other forms of genocide-specific exclusive victim con- 
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sciousness do not involve direct comparisons with other 
groups or competition over the victim status, but still focus 
exclusively on how a specific group has been victimized 
during genocide (Schori-Eyal et al., 2014). An important 
question is whether these two forms of genocide-specific 
exclusive victim consciousness – competitive versus non- 
competitive – are separate or whether they always go hand 
in hand. One example of general exclusive victim con- 
sciousness is siege mentality, the belief that for example, all 
women will be victims of rape during genocide. General 
exclusive victim consciousness can also be competitive in 
nature, for example, when group members claim that their 
group’s victimization is unparalleled in world history. 
In contrast to the exclusive understanding of victimiza- 
tion, there are perceived similarity between the suffering of 
one’s own group and other groups, which could be de- 
scribed as inclusive victim consciousness (Bilali et al., 2016). 
Conceptually related to the idea of general inclusive victim 
consciousness are two other lessons stemming from the 
experience of the Holocaust, namely to “never be a 
perpetrator” and to “never be a passive bystander”(Cohen, 
2001). The former involves the moral obligation not to 
harm other human beings, even if they are rivals or 
enemies. This can nevertheless be considered as general 
rather than genocide-specific because it links across 
different historical events and socio-political contexts, 
rather than focusing on the similarities of suffering 
between two parties. The lesson to never be a passive 
bystander is more general and links victimised group’s 
past experiences to other atrocities and group-based 
violence throughout the world (such as refugees in 
present-day genocides). Again, here we could witness the 
opening for a claim that civil society, as a whole, is a victim 
of genocide and, consequently, the assertion that 
international criminal law does not account for all the 
victims of genocide acquires more depth. Here as well, the 
argumentation that the international criminal law creates 
and reinforces a hierarchy of victims is further supported. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The promises of justice for all victims of genocide, as 
imbedded in the work of international criminal law, call 
out an enlightened, progressive moral force that has the 
power to vindicate victims, prosecute villains and end im- 
punity for these egregious crimes. While the inclusion of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence could be certainly 
be seen as a victory for victim vindication, an end to im- 
punity and an albeit extremely limited (and arguably im- 
possible) way to ensure that these crimes do not happen 
again, this contribution has questioned the ascendancy of 
rape as a crime against humanity as the producer of a range 
of unintended consequences for both victim and perpetra- 
tor subjectivity and agency. The increasing 
criminalisation of genocide rape at the international level 
no doubt points to the inherent but intractable dilemma 
of hierarchy arguments and the incredible power of law to 
pronounce meaning, demarcate the gravity of crimes and 
silence alternative stories. A balance must be struck, 
however, between seeing law as a venerable arbiter of  
atrocities on the one hand and seeing law as the ultimate 
expression of imperi- alism and violence on the other 
hand (Henry, 2013). Such an approach is about 
embracing a modest, as opposed to a cynical, approach to 
international criminal law (Booth and du Plessis, 2005), 
and appreciating both the limits and po- tential of this 
form of justice.To conclude, when consider- ing the 
practices of justice for genocide victims is imperative to 
ensure that gendered harms are thoroughly investigated, 
prosecuted and recognised. Consequently, first and 
foremost is important to make sure that the fiction of the 
authentic victim subject is deconstructed, and that more 
nuanced and unconventional narratives are also heard and 
validated. The substantive problems associated with the 
prosecution of sexual violence crimes should be investi- 
gated and remedied as much as possible, whilst arguments 
about what constitutes the worst crime, including what 
kinds of rape are worse than others, are to be actively 
avoided (Policek, 2011). The definition of the victim of 
genocide should be revised so that victims are not simply 
reduced to a sexed, injured and incapacitated body but are 
instead recognised, represented and respected as complex 
and diverse agents with differing justice needs. These re- 
minders are equally important for researchers of both do- 
mestic and genocide sexual violence. 
Atrocities committed on a large scale as in the case of 
genocide, can be prevented through constant and rigorous 
involvement of civil society (Schabas, 2000). It is therefore 
important to highlight that, through education and 
information, the victims of genocide are not only women, 
men, and children who have experienced first-hand the 
trauma of physical and psychological violence, but civil 
society as a whole (Policek, 2012). It is therefore 
necessary to use a more holistic approach in broadening 
the definition of a victim of genocide. The call here is for 
a criminal justice that is able to transform itself into global 
justice (Kurasawa, 2007), not a kind of universal justice 
but a justice that takes into account how the moral 
imperative of our time must be directed towards the 
prevention of genocide. Civil society is always a victim of 
genocide for at least two distinct reasons. From a 
practical point of view, almost in t literal terms, civil 
society is a victim of genocide, and as such it should be 
in a position to see this status recognized, when- ever the 
existence of entire groups of people is threatened. The 
possibility that civil society is identified as the victim, in 
proceedings against those who are guilty of genocide, in- 
volves the formal recognition that the whole society has in 
fact suffered physical and psychological injuries and harm. 
Economic damages are side effects of genocide, and 
practices of justice should consider the financial burden of 
set- ting up mediation, rehabilitation, education and 
prevention programs. There is also the economic damage 
that victimised groups, as witnesses and victims of the 
atrocities of genocide, suffer: the annihilation of groups 
that make up the workforce of a nation, for example, or 
the cost associated with rebuilding nation states affected 
by genocide. From a strategic point of view, it is only 
when civil society is given the status of victim, that 
human and economic re- sources are used for the purposes 
of prevention. Preventing 
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genocide is possible if the prerequisites are clearly identified: 
education for peace and non-violence are not to be con- 
sidered simply a marginal topics curriculum, but pillars of 
any nation founded on the principles of legality. The re- 
sponsibility of civil society once acquired the knowledge 
that the entire community is the victim of acts of genocide, 
it is to make sure that through the mass media, government 
bodies and local institutions, prevention programs can be 
implemented. 
Criminology as an academic discipline should engage 
in testimonial labour in response to genocide (Moon, 
2011).Too often, the tapestry which makes up criminology, 
is characterised by governmental evidence and policy led 
research used to legitimate the definition of certain key 
terms (Hillyard et al. 2004), thus not making space for mass 
atrocities, almost restraining criminology to sit at the edge 
of a mass grave.The task of criminology as bearing witness 
to genocide is constituted through its confrontations with 
a host of perils constantly threatening to submerge it: si- 
lence, incomprehension, indifference, forgetting and repe- 
tition (Cohen, 2001; Moon, 2011). By way of a publicly 
framed dialogical process that often crosses socio-cultural 
and territorial borders, the two parties engaged in testimo- 
nial labour – criminology as an academic discipline and its 
audience of scholars, politicians and civil society – are en- 
acting a pattern of social action composed of the task of 
speaking out and listening, representing and interpreting, 
preventing and often, when remembering past and current 
mass atrocities, creating empathy. 
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